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introduction
T his is the second of two articles that examine the origin, evolution and future potential of the recent emergence 
of a tentative “doctrinal culture” within the 
Canadian Air Force. In the first article it was 
postulated that the culture of the Canadian 
Air Force, like most other Western air forces, 
has not been traditionally characterised by 
a tendency towards theoretical or doctrinal 
development. Instead, a strong oral (rather than 
written) culture of passing lessons from senior 
to junior officers evolved early in the history 
of the Canadian Air Force and subsequently 
became entrenched. This was accompanied by a 
tendency to pragmatically focus on contempor-
ary issues, to the detriment of broader theor-
etical and doctrinal development.1
Recently, however, there have been some 
indications that the Canadian Air Force is 
beginning to shift away from this cultural para-
digm, and that a tentative culture of doctrinal 
development is emerging to take its place. 
Drawing on the background provided in Part 1, 
this article examines the Canadian Air Force’s 
attempts to develop doctrine since the forma-
tion of Air Command in 1975. This exam-
ination is undertaken in three sections. First, 
limited doctrine development between 1975 
and 1989 is briefly discussed. Second, doctrine 
development during the 1990s is analysed in 
relation to the international rejuvenation of air 
power theory that occurred during that decade. 
Third, the apparent emergence of a tentative 
doctrinal culture within the Canadian Air 
Force during the past decade is considered. In 
conclusion, the future potential of this tentative 
culture is addressed, and some challenges that 
remain to be overcome are highlighted.
liMitEd doctrinE 
dEvEloPMEnt, 1975‑1989
The first part of this article established 
that by the close of the Second World War the 
oral dissemination of ideas between officers 
had become a significant feature of Canadian 
Air Force culture. This was accompanied by 
a tendency to eschew written theory and 
doctrine and was perpetuated during the cold 
war by several major events. The first of these 
was the Royal Canadian Air Force’s (RCAF’s) 
adoption of Royal Air Force (RAF) and 
United States Air Force (USAF) tactical and 
operational doctrine (subject to its existence). 
Not only did this constitute a disincentive to 
the development of an independent body of 
Canadian Air Force theory and doctrine, it 
arguably served to narrow the focus of many 
officers to operational and tactical issues, to the 
detriment of strategic thinking.
The second major event was the unification 
of the Canadian Forces (CF) in 1968, which 
dismantled the RCAF and divided its former 
units between the CF’s six new “commands” 
according to their primary function. This division 
had the effect of heightening the prominence 
of the Canadian Air Force’s capability-based 
“communities,”2 something that has had ongoing 
ramifications for doctrine development within 
the Canadian Air Force ever since. In the 
short-term, unification eliminated the branch of 
the CF that had previously been responsible for 
the development of air power doctrine, without 
giving any indication as to which organisation 
would replace it.
The amalgamation of Air Defence and 
Air Transport Commands into Air Command 
in 1975 provided a foundation upon which a 
post-unification Canadian Air Force culture 
could be rebuilt.3 On its inauguration, the new 
command inherited a substantial doctrinal 
void. Since unification, virtually no air power 
doctrine, including that designed to guide the 
tactical level of conflict, had been produced by 
the CF. Despite the significance of this dearth, 
doctrine development progressed slowly, no 
doubt due—at least in part—to an ongoing 
cultural tendency to eschew to written theory 
and doctrine. The first noteworthy air power 
doctrine manual produced after unification, 
Conduct of Air Operations, was not released until 
June 1981.4 Even this was only an updated 
edition of a pre-1968 publication, and its scope 
and utility were severely limited.5
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Figure 1: Canadian air Force doctrine hierarchy endorsed by the aerospace doctrine Board in 1986.
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In 1984, Lieutenant-General Paul Manson, 
then Commander Air Command, convened 
a conference to address “the fragmented 
state of aerospace doctrine.”6 The outcome 
of the conference was the establishment of 
an Aerospace Doctrine Board (ADB) in 
1986, which quickly endorsed a new doctrine 
hierarchy (see Figure 1).7 From the outset, the 
hierarchy included a keystone doctrine manual,8 
which was published in 1989 under the title 
Basic Aerospace Doctrine.9
Although the production of Basic Aerospace 
Doctrine had the potential to constitute a 
significant step towards redressing the Can-
adian Air Force’s institutional apathy towards 
written theory and doctrine, this opportunity 
was ultimately lost for several reasons. First, 
despite the inclusion of brief explanations of 
military doctrine, “Canadian strategic doctrine” 
(strategic policy), the principles of war, and the 
relationship between war and the nation,10 the 
manual was not placed on a sound theoretical 
footing. Second, distribution of the manual 
appears to have been limited to within the CF 
(severely hampering its potential to initiate 
a broader theoretical debate about Canadian 
air power), even though it is unlikely that it 
ever had a “restricted” status. Third, the entire 
doctrine hierarchy, including Basic Aerospace 
Doctrine, failed to sufficiently address strategic-
level considerations, “in particular space and 
strategic aerospace defence.”11
Shortly after the release of Basic Aerospace 
Doctrine, the Canadian Air Force’s entire doc-
trine hierarchy fell into a state of disrepair. This 
was mainly due to the lack of manpower and 
expertise available to maintain the hierarchy’s 
currency on an ongoing basis,12 although this 
was most likely compounded by additional fac-
tors such as a lack of sound Canadian strategic 
policy guidance during the period and the Air 
Force’s existing cultural tendency to eschew 
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written doctrine. Canadian Air Force doctrine 
development subsequently waned during the 
early 1990s.
thE 1990s:  
“thE EManciPation 
of air PowEr”
Shortly after the release of Basic Aerospace 
Doctrine, the 1991 Gulf War led to the 
widespread re-emergence of the theoretical 
development of air power, an occurrence that 
would later be described by Markus Mader as 
“the emancipation of air power.”13 Regarding 
the Gulf War itself, Mader went on to assert 
that:
The contribution of the allied air forces to 
the campaign proved to be more than a 
supporting role and was in fact interpreted 
by many as a war-winning role. Airmen 
were henceforth considered to be equal 
partners to their military and maritime 
counterparts in the all-arms high-intensity 
warfare. Finally, it appeared, military avi-
ation could apply its technological edge to 
a degree which proved decisive, and live up 
to early 20th century imaginations.14
Largely responsible for the subsequent 
theoretical rejuvenation of air power was the 
widespread use of precision-guided munitions 
in both tactical and strategic roles. The use of 
these munitions was also a major contributing 
factor to the Revolution in Military Affairs 
(RMA) debate that took place during the 
early and mid 1990s.15 Although this debate 
focused primarily on technological advances 
and whether or not they had brought about 
a radical departure from previous modes of 
warfare, much of it was nonetheless related to 
the application of air power.16
Within Western air forces, this emancipa-
tion resulted in an increased willingness on 
the part of officers to discuss in writing what it 
was they did, and more importantly, how and 
why they did it. Against this backdrop, several 
air forces approached doctrine development 
with a fresh perspective, particularly in instan-
ces where doctrine was designed to provide 
overarching guidance at the strategic level.17
Yet doctrine development within the 
Canadian Air Force lagged a few years behind 
developments within allied air forces, such as 
the USAF and RAF (which had released new 
keystone doctrine manuals in 1992 and 1993 
respectively).18 One of the key reasons for this 
was circumstantial. As the Gulf War was taking 
place in the Middle East, the Soviet Union was 
in the final stages of collapse. As these events 
combined to trigger a period of global strategic 
uncertainty, the Canadian Air Force suffered 
particularly acutely from a lack of strategic 
policy guidance.
Even after Canada’s 1994 Defence White 
Paper finally provided some respite from the 
strategic uncertainty, the Air Force continued 
to suffer from a declining budgetary allocation. 
Although the White Paper had established 
a requirement for “[t]he retention of multi-
purpose, combat capable forces,”19 it had also 
shifted the operational emphasis towards 
the army. As a result of this new emphasis, 
the Canadian Air Force’s budget fell from 
C$3 billion in 1994 to C$2.2 billion in 1998.20
Furthermore, it is likely that the Canadian 
Air Force’s doctrinal lag behind other Western 
air forces was compounded by several of the 
factors that had historically resulted in the 
organisation’s cultural tendency to eschew 
to written theory and doctrine. In particular, 
the close cultural link between the Canadian 
Air Force and its American counterpart most 
probably led to a continued inclination on the 
part of Canadian Air Force officers to refer 
to USAF doctrine developments in prefer-
ence to undertaking doctrine development 
domestically.21
Despite these factors, the eventual catalyst 
for the Canadian Air Force’s production of a 
new keystone doctrine manual was a meeting of 
the ADB in October 1994, at which it was de-
termined that a replacement for Basic Aerospace 
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Doctrine was required. This was because Basic 
Aerospace Doctrine “lacked consistency and 
balance, perpetuated ‘stove piping,’ and did 
not reflect current thinking about air power.”22 
Although this determination was made in 
1994, it took almost three years for a replace-
ment publication to be developed. Furthermore, 
when production finally did occur, it was rushed 
so that something could be released in time for 
the 1997 Aerospace Power Conference. The 
result, Out of the Sun: Aerospace Doctrine for the 
Canadian Forces” was based primarily upon a 
précis on air power theory developed at the 
Canadian Forces College (CFC) in Toronto.”23
From the outset, Out of the Sun encoun-
tered a multitude of problems that ultimately 
led to its failure. The first of these was that (as 
had been the case with Basic Aerospace Doctrine) 
there was no effective authority to distribute, 
publicise, update or maintain it.24 Abetting this 
problem was the unique format of Out of the 
Sun, which was originally released as a unilin-
gual publication without a National Defence 
Index of Documentation (NDID) number, 
meaning that it could not be traced or ordered 
through official channels.25
The second problem Out of the Sun en-
countered was that its content was intellectually 
questionable. In particular, its discussion about 
the spectrum of air force operations preceded 
under three headings (air combat, supporting 
air and sustainment operations),26 the ac-
companying definitions of which were often 
simplistic and occasionally contradictory.27 As 
a result, Out of the Sun failed to explain the 
rationale underlying the existence of Canada’s 
Air Force. As Paul Mitchell noted, “Out of the 
Sun tells one how the air force seeks to ac-
complish its missions, but not why, nor more 
importantly, why this is critical to Canada as a 
nation.”28 Like Basic Aerospace Doctrine before 
it, Out of the Sun had not been placed on a 
sound theoretical footing.
Finally, Out of the Sun fell victim to the 
strong influence capability-based communities 
had within the Canadian Air Force. Indeed, 
the content of Out of the Sun aroused the 
objection of elements within almost all of the 
air force’s capability-based communities. As a 
result, the majority of the Air Force itself failed 
to embrace the manual and its effect, if it had 
one, is barely noticeable.29 Following the 1997 
Aerospace Power Conference, Out of the Sun 
appears to have been unofficially relegated to 
use as an instruction manual at the CFC. As 
Paul Johnston asserted, “there is scant evidence 
that it is ever used or referred to by anyone 
actually applying air power.”30
thE rEcEnt EMErgEncE 
of a tEntativE doctrinal 
culturE
By the close of the 1990s the Canadian 
Air Force had produced two keystone doctrine 
manuals in the span of a decade, and both 
had ultimately failed to have much (if any) 
impact. Underlying these dual failures were 
three common factors. The first was the failure 
to base the content of the manuals upon a 
sound theoretical framework and second 
was inadequate distribution. When these 
factors combined with the third factor—the 
air force’s longstanding institutional apathy 
towards written theory and doctrine—the 
failure of both doctrine manuals can be seen as 
unsurprising.
Following the release of Out of the Sun, 
Canadian Air Force doctrine development 
again waned. A restructuring of air force 
headquarters necessitated changes to the 
ADB, which was renamed the Air Doctrine 
and Concepts Board (ADCB) in 1997. At its 
inaugural meeting, the ADCB endorsed a new 
doctrine hierarchy to replace the hierarchy that 
had been endorsed in 1986 (see Figure 2).31 
The progress of events thereafter was later 
summarised by Colonel John Westrop:
The inaugural session of the ADCB was 
convened at NDHQ [National Defence 
Headquarters] on 29 Nov 97, and the 
subsequent (and final) session took place 
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on 26 May 98. Since then there has been 
little activity by the ADCB; in particular 
there has been no progress on developing 
the “new” hierarchy of aerospace doctrine 
manuals. Instead, sporadic action has taken 
place to update some doctrine publications 
in the “old” hierarchy. With minor excep-
tions, since the reconfiguration of the ADB 
into the ADCB, the coherent promulga-
tion of CF aerospace doctrine has virtually 
ceased.32
In December 2000 this situation was 
formerly acknowledged by the Air Force 
Development Committee, which proposed 
a study be conducted to determine a course 
of action for rectifying the absence of up-to-
date air force doctrine. In August 2001, an 
“Aerospace Doctrine Study” commenced under 
the direction of Colonel Westrop.33
The Study’s final report, dated April 30, 
2002, made several recommendations. Key 
among these were the creation of an “Aerospace 
Doctrine Authority” (ADA) and an “aerospace 
doctrine system framework” to allow doctrine 
to be developed and disseminated, and also 
to undertake the “research, education, lessons 
learned, experimentation and simulation, 
and possibly history and heritage” functions 
associated with the development and application 
of doctrine.34 To supplement this, it was also 
recommended that an Air Force publications 
centre be established and that the ADA be 
given a secondary role as the “CF Aerospace 
Warfare Authority,” in order to ensure it was 
operating from a position of authority when 
developing and disseminating doctrine.35
By coincidence, the delivery of the final 
report of the Aerospace Doctrine Study 
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coincided with a crucial juncture in the air 
force’s “transformation” program, which had 
commenced in 1999. As a result, the implemen-
tation of several of the study’s recommenda-
tions subsequently became a central part of the 
program.
The catalyst for Air Force transformation 
was the June 1999 release of Strategy 2020,36 
which had been developed by the Department 
of National Defence (DND) to provide stra-
tegic guidance in the wake of numerous budget 
cuts that occurred during the late 1990s.37 In 
2000, the Air Force released a response to the 
strategy, titled Vectors 2020: An Air Force Stra-
tegic Assessment. Primarily, Vectors 2020 provided 
“a series of signposts about air operations in 
2020 so as to assist us in developing the air 
force of the future.”38
Over the following few years, air force 
transformation was conceptually advanced 
by the release of two further documents. The 
first of these was The Aerospace Capability 
Framework, which established a comprehensive 
short-to-mid term agenda designed to provide 
more detail about the early steps in the trans-
formation process.39 The second document was 
Strategic Vectors: The Air Force Transformation Vi-
sion. This document established eight “vectors,” 
which focused on a broad variety of operational, 
personnel and public relations priorities.40
Owing to the timing of the delivery of 
the Aerospace Doctrine Study’s final report, 
several of its recommendations were featured 
as a central component of the transforma-
tion agenda established within both of these 
documents. Most importantly, The Aerospace 
Capability Framework directed the establish-
ment of a Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare 
Centre (CFAWC).41 The establishment of the 
Centre was also a key part of the fourth “vector” 
contained within Strategic Vectors.42 CFAWC 
was mandated to develop Canadian Air Force 
doctrine and distribute it, as well as conducting 
the related research, education, experimenta-
tion, simulation, lessons learned and conceptual 
development functions that had been identified 
as requirements by the Aerospace Doctrine 
Study.43
Following its establishment in October 
2005, CFAWC undertook its educational and 
conceptual development functions through the 
commission of studies, and—more prominently 
—through the establishment of The Canadian 
Air Force Journal. Both of these activities have 
constituted important steps towards finally 
establishing a written culture within the Air 
Force. The primary responsibility of CFAWC, 
however, is the production of doctrine. Work on 
a new keystone manual commenced immedi-
ately after the establishment of the Centre, 
leading to the release of Canadian Forces 
Aerospace Doctrine in early 2007.44
Importantly, this new manual does not 
appear to suffer from the same shortfalls as 
its two predecessors. Conceptually, Canadian 
Forces Aerospace Doctrine’s major contribution 
occurred in its fifth chapter, which enunciated 
“the functions of Canada’s Air Force.”45 The 
five functions—sense, shape, move, sustain, 
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command—were derived from the Army’s 
combat functions, which have constituted a 
fundamental component of the evolution of 
Canadian army conceptual thinking since 
2001.46
The decision to adapt an Army concept 
for use within Air Force doctrine probably 
came about for two reasons. First, it was felt 
that the concepts traditionally included in Air 
Force doctrine were “too inflexible.” Early in 
the development process, the writing team was 
ordered to instead develop a functions-based 
approach for inclusion in the new manual. 
After a brief investigation, Army doctrine was 
selected as the “blueprint” for this development 
because Army conceptual development was 
perceived as comparatively advanced.47 Second, 
it has been asserted that there was a growing 
feeling within the Air Force during the early 
2000s that “the Army and Navy appears [sic] to 
have been able to make a politically better case 
for their service than the Air Force has.”48 The 
adaptation of an Army concept for use within 
Air Force doctrine may also have been part of 
an attempt to close this perceived gap.
Regardless of the reasons why the Air 
Force adapted an Army concept for inclusion 
within its own doctrine, a significant benefit of 
the development of the five functions is that it 
allowed the doctrine’s discussion about Can-
adian air power to be located within a sound 
theoretical framework. Furthermore, the Air 
Force appears to have been able to successfully 
tie the roles of its various communities into this 
broader conceptual model, thus avoiding the 
problem of acceptance that was encountered 
following the release of Out of the Sun.
Steps have also been taken towards 
addressing the other problems previously 
encountered by Canadian Air Force doctrine. 
Unlike previous manuals, the release of Can-
adian Forces Aerospace Doctrine was widely 
publicised. Furthermore, distribution was not 
limited to within the Air Force itself and a link 
to a publicly-available online version has been 
prominently placed on CFAWC’s homepage.49 
Finally, the establishment of CFAWC and the 
subsequent publication of The Canadian Air 
Force Journal in particular have constituted sig-
nificant moves towards establishing a broader 
culture of writing within the Canadian Air 
Force. In the longer term, the eventual success 
or failure of this attempt to generate cultural 
change within the Air Force is likely to be the 
most significant determinant of the ultimate 
success or failure of Canadian Forces Aerospace 
Doctrine.
conclusion
Although it is still too early to determine 
whether Canadian Forces Aerospace Doctrine will 
ultimately be successful, from the outset the 
manual has been given a better chance than its 
predecessors. This is mainly because steps have 
been taken to address the problems that led to 
the failure of previous doctrine manuals.
In the longer term, other initiatives such 
as the establishment of CFAWC and the 
subsequent production of publications such as 
The Canadian Air Force Journal will also play a 
role in determining the extent of the doctrine’s 
success. Together, Canadian Forces Aerospace 
Doctrine and these other recent initiatives con-
stitute an important step towards reversing the 
historic tendency of the Canadian Air Force 
to neglect written theories and doctrines of air 
power. The nature and timing of these other 
initiatives also suggests that a tentative doc-
trinal culture is emerging within the Canadian 
Air Force at the institutional level. Although 
it appears that this emergence began with 
the conduct of the Aerospace Doctrine Study 
during the early 2000s, this has only become 
apparent with the benefit of hindsight.
At the time of writing this article, it re-
mains to be seen whether this apparent cultural 
shift will be transient or enduring. Importantly, 
there are still several things that need to occur 
if the Canadian Air Force wants to ensure the 
permanency of what appears to be a fledgling 
doctrinal culture. These requirements mainly 
relate to the need to generate wider support 
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for recent initiatives. The establishment of 
CFAWC and the publication of a new doctrine 
manual indicate institutional level reforms; 
the need now is to ensure that the generation 
of ongoing support for these reforms becomes 
prevalent throughout the Air Force at a “grass 
roots” level.
First, there is a need to expand efforts to 
generate (then perpetuate) a culture charac-
terised by air power theoretical development 
and the written dissemination of ideas. While 
the publication of The Canadian Air Force 
Journal has been a great start, it has yet to reach 
its full potential. With a few notable excep-
tions, substantial articles appearing in previous 
editions have tended to focus on technological, 
tactical or operational issues, or alternatively 
have been authored by personnel posted to 
CFAWC. While there is nothing wrong with 
this (indeed, it is an excellent start), the genera-
tion of a broader theoretical debate about the 
role of air power in the Canadian context could 
constitute a large step towards engendering a 
lasting written culture conducive to doctrinal 
success.
Second, despite its comparatively wide 
distribution and online availability, the release 
of Canadian Forces Aerospace Doctrine has not 
been followed by a written, public debate 
about the relevance or utility of its content.50 
Such a debate would constitute an important 
mechanism for improving the content of future 
editions, as well as for ensuring that they con-
tinue to be located within a sound theoretical 
framework. Furthermore, wide distribution 
does not guarantee that the doctrine will be 
widely read. Regarding this potential problem, 
the Canadian Air Force may benefit from the 
Royal Australian Air Force’s experience. In that 
air force, new keystone doctrine manuals are 
usually launched at high-profile events such as 
air shows (raising media and public awareness) 
and their internal distribution is accompanied 
by a Chief of Air Force order stating that all 
personnel are to read them.51
Finally, now that the Canadian Air Force 
has a viable keystone doctrine manual, it must 
ensure that updated editions are regularly 
produced, in order to maintain the relevance 
of its doctrine in view of the evolution of 
Canadian national strategy and changes in 
the nature of air force operations. In the past, 
the release of Canadian Air Force doctrine 
manuals has been followed by long periods of 
inactivity. Were this to occur again, it would 
likely contribute to the loss of the Air Force’s 
tentative doctrinal culture. Fortunately, the 
establishment of  CFAWC as a doctrine 
development “centre of excellence” indicates 
that such a period of doctrinal inactivity is less 
likely to occur again. Indeed, the Canadian Air 
Force’s recent undertakings have already put the 
organisation in a good position to transform its 
tentative doctrinal culture into something more 
permanent. Whether this opportunity is taken, 
however, remains to be seen. ■
Editor’s Note: In editing this article, the author’s  
Australian spelling conventions have been maintained.
list of abbreviations
ada aerospace doctrine authority
adB aerospace doctrine Board
adCB air doctrine and Concepts Board
CF Canadian Forces
CFaWC Canadian Forces aerospace Warfare Centre
CFC Canadian Forces College
dnd department of national defence
ndhQ national defence headquarters
ndid national defence index of documentation
raF royal air Force
rCaF royal Canadian air Force
rMa revolution in Military affairs
uSaF united States air Force
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